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ABSTRACT 
                A wide literature in strategic management is dedicated to the study of technology 
networks as a locus of innovation. They shape an organizational field in which strategic alliances 
leverage firm capabilities to generate new knowledge and access complementary assets. Much 
less attention, however, has been focused on the role played by other particular players - that we 
label ‘intermediary institutions’ - in the institutional foundation of those networks. In the present 
paper, our intent is to highlight the choice made by alliance partners, members of a same 
technology network, to have recourse to services proposed by ‘intermediary institutions’ in order 
to ease their alliance relationships. We propose an analysis of the impact of this choice on the 
institutional design of the network as a whole. We argue that by backing up a firms’ alliance 
activities, ‘intermediary institutions’ deepen the relational, structural and cognitive embeddedness 
of the firm within its network. In turn, reinforced embeddedness helps go beyond the conflict 
between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to protect’, typical of technology networks, and so enhances 
the viability of the network as a whole.  
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INTRODUCTION 
   
Albeit a wide literature in the field of business economics and strategic management is 
dedicated to the inter-organizational networks, the great majority of papers have been focused on 
the inter-firm relationships within the networks. By comparison, the role of other players than 
firms in the network and their contributions to its functioning have received limited attention 
(Provan and Kenis 2006; Provan et al. 2007). Following the organizational economics reasoning, 
however, we suppose that their raison d’être follows efficiency purposes: without them, the 
network on a whole would be very unlikely to strive and even to survive in some cases.  
In this study we thus examine the role of ‘intermediary institutions’ in technology networks. As 
pointed out by Howells (2006), these institutions refer to third parties, bridgers, brokers and other 
forms of intermediaries: examples in technology networks are industry federations, chambers of 
commerce, auditing firms, incubators, technology transfer offices or technology brokers. In this 
theoretical contribution, we argue that services developed by ‘intermediary institutions’ increase 
firms‘embeddedness within the technology network. Therefore, they substantially help reduce the 
tensions between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to protect’ which are inherent to corporate inter-
organizational relations. The positive externalities within the networks are supported by the firms 
as long as they are superior to the costs they create. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is 
one of the first attempts to explain the economic rationale behind these intermediary institutions.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we examine the internal conflict that 
technology strategic alliances face - namely the conflict between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to 
protect’, and show how relational, structural, and cognitive embeddedness contributes to dealing 
with this internal conflict. In the second section, we develop propositions regarding the impact of 
 2
support services offered by ‘intermediary institutions’ on the relational, structural, and cognitive 
embeddedness of the firm within its network.    
EMBEDDEDNESS AND CONFLICT BETWEEN ‘TRYING TO LEARN’ AND ‘TRYING 
TO PROTECT’ IN TECHNOLOGY NETWORKS 
Internal conflict of technology strategic alliances: ‘trying to learn’ versus ‘trying to protect’ 
 
Although firms realize numerous benefits by participating in strategic alliances, alliances have to 
deal with challenging tensions between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to protect’, which are 
particularly prevalent in learning alliances (Gulati and Singh 1998; Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 
2000). Tensions stem from the fact that, on one hand, firms participate in alliances to learn know-
how and capabilities from their alliance partners and, on the other hand, firms want to protect 
themselves from the behavior of their partners which have similar incentives (Kale et al. 2000). 
Indeed, during the value creation process, each partner of a technology alliance has to expose 
proprietary assets to the other(s). Any firm has opportunities to learn from its partner(s). 
Consequently, beyond usual concerns on the real efforts of each partner within the alliance (free 
riding), these absorption and learning issues raise concerns on the externalities generated by the 
cooperation; i.e. independent redeployments of new assets or competences into other projects and 
dilution of specific corporate competitive advantage.  
As a result, on the one hand, alliance partners will try to get new information and knowledge 
from the other parts that could be used for other purposes than the cooperation’s ones themselves. 
Since partners do not ‘unlearn’, they will try to build on their new skills and capabilities and 
exploit them in other projects. On the other hand, each alliance partner will prefer to protect its 
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own assets and competences which are core; otherwise it will be at risk to loose the basis of 
competitive advantage. In other words, the perspective of value appropriation inhibits the process 
of value creation but value appropriation is meaningless without value creation upstream.  
Hierarchy and Embeddedness in Technology Networks 
Several ways to cope with these tensions have been explored in the literature. First, the 
transaction cost literature on strategic alliances suggests that this problem can be mitigated by the 
choice of more hierarchical modes of governance (e.g., Williamson 1991; Oxley 1999). 
Basically, when partners cannot set up an agreement on value appropriation, they will opt for an 
equity agreement (equity joint venture). In that case, the strategic alliance is governed by a 
bilateral hierarchy, which is more able to closely coordinate and monitor the partners inside the 
alliance via enhanced communication, organizational routines, and necessity for continuous 
collaboration (Kogut 1988). Such solution, however, suffers from limitations: (1) it implies that 
partners support bureaucratic costs; (2) it does not allow controlling for partners’ behavior 
outside the alliance; and (3) it remains depending on the external credibility to enforce the 
decisions of partners in case of conflicts. 
Second, as pointed out by Kale et al. (2000), the inter-organizational network literature 
investigates the mechanism of social embeddedness in alliances. Social embeddedness has been 
introduced in economic sociology by Granovetter (1985) and has been extensively studied by 
Gulati (e.g., Gulati 1995; Gulati 1998; Gulati and Garguilo 1999; Gulati and Singh 1999). 
Following Nahapiet and Goshal (1998), we differentiate social embeddedness in relational 
embeddedness, structural embeddedness and cognitive embeddedness. These three types of 
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embeddedness enable to balance the tensions between learning and protecting knowledge in 
technology networks (Figure 1).  
First, relational embeddedness is relative to the quality and depth of a dyadic tie (Granovetter 
1985,1992; Uzzi 1996,1997; Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti 1997). As explained by Jones, Hesterly 
and Borgatti (1997), it captures the degree to which exchange parties consider one another’s need 
and goals (Granovetter 1992) and the behaviors exchange parties exhibit, such as trust, confiding, 
and information sharing (Uzzi 1997). Relational embeddedness resulting from prior cohesive ties 
between alliance partners allows to mitigate the tensions between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to 
protect’ since prior cohesive ties increase the mutual trust, respect, and friendship for subsequent 
cooperation (Podolny 1994; Burt and Knez 1995; Gulati 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). So as 
shown by Kale et al. (2000), relational capital facilitates learning through close interactions 
between alliance partners. Simultaneously, it creates a strong deterrent effect on potential 
opportunistic behavior aimed at unilaterally absorbing or stealing information or know-how that 
is core or proprietary to its partners.  
Second, structural embeddedness reflects the extent to which “a dyad’s mutual contacts are 
connected to one another” (Granovetter 1992). In other words, structural embeddedness means 
that parties may have relationships with the same third party, and are therefore indirectly linked 
(Granovetter 1985, 1992; Uzzi 1996,1997; Jones et al. 1997). The underlying tenet of the 
structural embeddedness dimension is that inter-firm networks cannot be validly decomposed into 
independent ‘bilateral monopolies’ (Baker 1990; Simsek, Lubtakin and Floyd 2003). The study 
of the influence of social relationships on the firm behaviors requires to go beyond the firm dyads 
as unit of analysis (Granovetter 1992) and the focus of analysis shifts from direct communication 
to indirect channels for information and reputation effects (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Structural 
embeddedness enables to mitigate the tensions between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to protect’ 
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for reasons that have notably been stressed by Gulati and Gargiulo (1999). When two firms share 
common ties, it signals that both are considered as suitable and trustworthy by the same firms. 
Moreover, common third-party ties contribute to creating a reputational lock-in and opportunistic 
behavior may be reported. This spiral effect serves as an effective deterrent (Raub and Wessie 
1990; Burt and Knez 1995).  
Third, cognitive embeddedness refers to the proximity in the representation, interpretation, and 
systems of meaning among firms (Abrahamson and Fombrun 1994; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; 
Simsek et al. 2003). Cognitive embeddedness also contributes to mitigating the tensions between 
‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to protect’ since it fosters a network culture notably based on 
converging expectations (Williamson 1991), an idiosyncratic language to summarize complex 
routines and information (Williamson 1975, 1985) and to define broad rules for action under 
uncertainty (Camerer and Vepsalainen 1988). 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
While some arguments can be found in the existing literature to explain how these three 
attributes of social embeddedness contribute to balancing the tensions between ‘trying to learn’ 
and ‘trying to protect’, this issue has received very limited attention. In our opinion, stressing the 
role played by ‘intermediary institutions’ at this level gives new insights into how social 
embeddedness of alliance partners within a technology network helps mitigate tensions within the 
network as a whole.  
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LINK BETWEEN INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS AND EMBEDDEDNESS IN 
TECHNOLOGY NETWORKS  
In this section, we examine the impact of ‘intermediary institutions’ on the firm’s embeddness in 
its technology network. We consider ‘intermediary institutions’ as entities that offer service(s) to 
firms aiming at facilitating their alliance activities. Examples of ‘intermediary institutions’ in 
technology networks are collective research centers, industry federations, chambers of commerce, 
auditing firms, incubators, technology transfer offices or technology brokers. Ten support 
services in the innovation process have been identified by Howells (2006): (1) foresight and 
diagnostics, (2) scanning and information processing, (3) knowledge processing, generation, and 
combination, (4) gate keeping and brokering, (5) testing, validation, and training (6) accreditation 
and standards, (7) regulation and arbitration, (8) protecting the results, (9) commercializing and 
exploiting the outcomes, (10) assessment and evaluation.  
While these ten support services are essentially dedicated to support a specific strategic 
alliance, they impact on the technology network in which the alliance is embedded due to the 
organizational mechanisms they implement. Through their support services, ‘intermediary 
institutions’ have the ability to strongly influence the innovation culture and content of the 
network (i.e. which innovation approach to foster), to reinforce the reputational lock-in within the 
network, to reduce the information asymmetry among the members of the network, to implement 
a formal or informal dynamic of control within the network, to propose coordination tools to 
network’s members, and to impose a formal or informal regulation via procedures such as 
arbitration and collective sanctions.        
Starting from the ten functions of intermediary institutions, we develop propositions about the 
link between intermediary institutions and the firm’s relational, structural and cognitive 
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embeddedness within its technology network. Thereby we differentiate five groups of support 
services of intermediary institutions: 
(I) Intermediary institutions involved in (1) foresight and diagnostics, (2) scanning and 
information processing, (3) knowledge processing, generation, and combination 
These support services respond to the firms’ potential need for help to “identify what they might 
need from partners or even more generally what their innovation and business strategy should 
be” (Howells 2006). In that respect, some ‘intermediary institutions’ provide firms with scanning 
and technology intelligence advices in order to help firms identify where they should be 
searching and seeking information in the first place. They are involved in support services 
relative to technology foresights and forecasting, and articulation of needs and requirements. 
They are dedicated to complementing corporate technology intelligence and search support 
services. The third support service goes further than foresight, diagnostics and scanning and 
consists either in combining the collected information from foresight, diagnostics and scanning 
with the firm’s specific knowledge or in generating in-house research and technical knowledge to 
combine with the firm’s knowledge (Howells 2006).  
When guiding firms at these preliminary levels, ‘intermediary institutions’ have the ability to 
strongly influence the content of networks in terms of which innovation approach to foster within 
networks. This allows them to favor, at the same time, a network innovation culture through 
convergence of expectations and idiosyncratic language to summarize complex routines and 
information. A consistent innovation culture will be determining to ease and enhance the future 
collaboration within the network.  
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The first class of support services reinforces the cognitive embeddedness within the technology 
network. A consistent innovation culture contributes to harmonizing the representations, 
interpretations, and system of meaning among firms, and so to fostering the cognitive 
embeddedness (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Provan et al. 2007). The earlier the intervention of 
‘intermediary institutions’ in the innovation process, the stronger their ability to influence the 
network innovation culture, and so the higher the cognitive embeddedness.  
 
Proposition 1: ‘intermediary institutions’ involved in foresight and diagnostics, scanning and 
information processing, and/or knowledge processing, generation, and combination  have a 
positive impact on the cognitive embeddedness. 
(II) Intermediary institutions involved in (4) gatekeeping and brokering 
This support service consists of matchmaking and brokering collaborative deals for the client 
firm(s) on the one hand, and in providing contractual advice, on the other hand (Howells 2006). 
The main difficulty firms may face in determining with whom to ally is to obtain information 
about the competencies, needs, and reliability of potential partners (Van de Ven 1976; 
Stinchcombe 1990; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). As pointed out by Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), 
because of imperfect information within networks, partners experience high search costs and 
opportunism risks. ‘Intermediary institutions’ contribute to mitigating this difficulty since they 
may serve as formal or informal repositories of information about players’ resources, capabilities 
and needs on the one hand, and about players’ reputation, on the other hand. 
First, regarding the information about players’ resources, capabilities, and needs, the role of 
‘intermediary institutions’ is to collect and disseminate it. They thus enable firms to gather 
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superior information on each other (Gulati 1995; Gulati et al. 2000) and to identify potential 
partners and learn about their resources and capabilities. Second, obtaining information about 
players’ reputation is particularly crucial within technology networks since the assets are often 
characterized by high relationship-specificity and represent sunk costs that have little value 
outside of the particular exchange relationship. Therefore, the continuity of the relationship 
within technology networks is highly valued and, in the presence of opportunism, the 
relationship-specificity poses a serious safeguarding problem. ‘Intermediary institutions’ may 
allow to avoid allying with recurrent opportunistic partners since they may have a higher ability 
to collect, convey information, and to publicize defaults under the rules within the network3 
(Hadfield 2000).  
This group of support services reinforces the structural embeddedness within the technology 
network. As a result, ‘intermediary institutions’ allow to complement information stemming from 
structural embeddedness about competences, needs, and reliability of firms. Indeed, when 
considering the structural embeddedness, the focus of analysis is indirect channels for 
information and reputation effects (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). In this line, ‘intermediary 
institutions’ may be considered as additional nodes that develop for themselves numerous direct 
and indirect links since intermediaries are at the nexus of a web of multiple vertical and 
horizontal relationships (Howells 2006).   
We can therefore suggest, on the basis of the network centrality arguments (Freeman 1979; 
Krackhardt 1990; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), that the more central the informational position of 
these intermediary institutions is, the more accurate their own representation of the existing 
network is, the more efficient their impact on the decisions about new cooperative ties can be. 
                                                          
3 They can serve as repositories of players’ reputational information regarding, for instance, the debts unpaid or 
the low-quality goods delivered. 
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Central organizations have a larger ‘intelligence web’ through which they can learn about 
collaborative opportunities, hence lowering their level of uncertainty about partnerships (Gulati 
1999). Given the informational benefits ‘intermediary institutions’ get from being in a central 
position, they allow firms to go beyond their proximate direct and indirect ties.  
 
Proposition 2: ‘intermediary institutions’ involved in gate keeping and brokering have a positive 
impact on the structural embeddedness.  
(III) Intermediary institutions involved in (5) testing, validation, and training  
This support service involves (1) testing, diagnostics, analysis and inspection, (2) prototyping and 
pilot facilities, (3) scale-up, (4) validation, and (5) training. At this level of the innovation 
process, ‘intermediary institutions’ may put at the firms’ disposal their specialist facilities and/or 
may perform activities such as diagnostics, testing, prototyping, and training dedicated to 
facilitating the inter-firm collaboration (Howells 2006).  
This group of support services reinforces the relational embeddedness in the technology 
network. Beyond the purpose of facilitating and supporting the inter-firm collaboration, those 
support services contribute to controlling the activities carried out by each party and its task 
performance on behalf of the other parties. This second purpose enables firms to mitigate risks 
from behavioral uncertainty and to reduce direct measurement costs (Eisenhardt 1985) of outputs 
and/or behaviors of other parties. As a result, testing, validation, and training support services 
correspond to coordination and control tools, which contribute to building trustworthy 
relationships favoring the consideration of one another’s need and goals, the information sharing, 
and so the relational embeddedness.     
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 Proposition 3: ‘intermediary institutions’ involved in testing, validation, and training have a 
positive impact on the relational embeddedness.  
(IV) Intermediary institutions involved in (6) accreditation and standards work, (7) 
regulation and arbitration 
‘Intermediary institutions’ generally play a key role in setting standards and norms, which 
formally drive the collaboration within the network. Second, ‘intermediary institutions’ are 
privileged vectors to diffuse values and foster a network culture (Jones 1996; Jones et al. 1997). 
These formal and informal regulations may lead to formal and/or informal schemes of collective 
sanction(s). As defined by Jones et al. (1997), collective sanctions are produced by group 
members against other group members because they violated the norms or the values of the 
network. Sanctions can go from rumors to exclusion and sabotage. Collective sanctions make the 
opportunism more costly since opportunistic behaviors damage not only the specific alliance in 
which one behave opportunistically, but also the other current and potential alliances (Blumberg 
2001).  
In addition, some ‘intermediary institutions’ may provide arbitration mechanisms. When 
opting for arbitration, parties voluntary agree to refer their dispute to an impartial third person 
and agree, in advance, to be bound by the decision of that person (Bonn 1972). These 
mechanisms enjoy sources of efficiencies over the public courts (Richman 2004; McMillan and 
Woodruff 2000; Hadfield 2000), and that is particularly true in the case of innovation. First, 
arbitrators are more expert and specialized than public courts and are chosen on the basis of their 
expertise regarding the subject matter in dispute. Second, specialized rules are tailored to the 
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idiosyncratic needs and transactional challenges of firms having recourse to a specific 
‘intermediary institution’. The principles guiding the dispute resolution process rest on custom 
rather than on law. Third, specialized procedures are used to act more swiftly, at lower costs, and 
with more nuances than public courts. They permit greater flexibility and higher speed in 
business relationships. Fourth, the arbitrator can consider information that could not be 
introduced in public court (Bonn 1972). 
This group of support services reinforces the relational embeddedness within the technology 
network. The support services of accreditation, regulation, and arbitration may strongly impact on 
the network development. As pointed out by Sydow and Winderler (1998), the network 
development is not only the result of the use of resources, the use of rules and norms produced as 
steering mechanisms also drives the development of network. However, the influence of these 
rules on the network development is determined by the meaning the individual firms attach to 
them and so by the meaning, goals, and value of all firms within the network (Lipparini and Lomi 
1999). These formal or informal rules and norms may support bilateral relationships and magnify 
their quality and depth since they contribute to increasing trust, confiding, information sharing, 
and to diminishing the uncertainty associated with future partnerships.   
 
Proposition 4: ‘intermediary institutions’ involved in accreditation, and/or regulation and 
arbitration have a positive impact on the relational embeddedness.  
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(V) Intermediary institutions involved in (8) protecting the results, (9) commercialization, 
(10) evaluation of outcomes      
The services (8 and 9) are respectively associated with protecting and commercializing the 
outcomes of innovation and collaboration (Howells 2006). They consist respectively in providing 
IP advice and management, and in identifying market opportunities, developing business plans 
and assessing and providing filtering capability for funding. The tenth support service is relative 
to the assessment and evaluation of ‘post innovation’ (Howells 2006). These support services 
reinforces the cognitive embeddedness within the technology network. When guiding firms at 
these downstream stages in the innovation process, ‘intermediary institutions’ have the ability to 
influence current and future content of networks in terms of which innovation approach to foster. 
This stems from the fact that they help both firms and the network to gain legitimacy, on the one 
hand (support services 8 and 9), and they work for assuring a continuous updating of the network 
innovation content (support service 10), on the other hand.  
 
Proposition 5: ‘intermediary institutions’ involved in protecting the results, commercialization, 
and/or evaluation of outcomes have a positive impact on the cognitive embeddedness.  
 
Table 1 provides a synthetic view of the five propositions. ‘Intermediary institutions’ strongly 
contribute to reinforcing the social embeddedness of firms within their technology network. 
Search costs and opportunistic behaviors are substantially lowered for firms in the network (by 
comparison with a world without any intermediary institutions). Firms within the network are 
less exposed to the tensions between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to protect’ and are more focused 
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on their innovative effort. Without being directly innovation producers, intermediary institutions 
are thus active supports in innovative processes. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of the present paper was to shed light on the critical role played by ‘intermediary 
institutions’ in balancing the conflicting objectives between ‘trying to learn’ and ‘trying to 
protect’ in technology networks. We argue that the choice made by a firm to have recourse to 
support services offered by ‘intermediary institutions’ for its alliance activities reinforce its 
relational, structural, and cognitive embeddedness, and so mitigates the tensions between learning 
and protecting inside its strategic alliances.  
This paper is a first attempt to explicitly address the raison d’être of these particular 
governance mechanisms that contribute to designing the institutional foundation of technology 
networks. However, further research is necessary to empirically evaluate and generalize our 
results. In addition, we can derive the following implications for future research. First, 
management studies on networks need to adopt a broader view than investigating the dyadic 
structure of inter-organizational alliances. Apart from few exceptions (Provan et al. 2007), this is 
a very underexplored research issue. A better understanding of network governance would be 
also useful for decision makers. We are in a time of public policies claiming that innovation is at 
the first rank and many projects are launched to back up clusters, regional initiatives, innovation 
platforms, etc. More research findings at the network level could help to establish successful 
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strategic initiatives. The present contribution on the institutional intermediaries is an effort in that 
direction. 
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Figure 1 Social embeddedness and the limitation of conflicts in technology strategic 
alliances 
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Table 1 Social embeddedness and support services of the ‘intermediary institutions’ in the 
innovation networks 
  
Embeddedness  
Reinforced 
Organizational 
Mechanisms 
Support services of ‘intermediary institutions’ in  
the innovation process (based on Howells 2006) 
Coordination tools +  
Control mechanisms 
5. Testing, validation, and training 
6. Accreditation and standards 
Relational embeddedness 
 
Arbitration mechanisms + 
Collective sanction mechanisms 7. Regulation and arbitration 
Structural embeddedness 
 
 
 
 
 
Information asymmetry reduction 
mechanisms +  
Reputation mechanisms 
4. Gatekeeping and brokering 
1. Foresight and diagnostics 
2. Scanning and information processing 
Content definition mechanisms 
3. Knowledge processing, generation, and  
combination 
8. IP: Protecting the results 
9. Commercialization: exploiting the outcomes 
Cognitive embeddedness 
 
 
 
 Content definition mechanisms 
10. Assessment and evaluation  
 
 
 20
